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In the philosophy of mind, the study of mental life has tended to focus on three central 
aspects of mental states: their representational content, their functional role, and their 
phenomenal character. The representational content of a mental state is what the state 
represents, what it is about; its functional role is the causal role it plays within the 
functional organization of the subject’s overall psychology; its phenomenal character is 
the experiential or subjective quality that goes with what it is like, from the inside, to be 
in it. The study of this third aspect of mental life is known as phenomenology. Thus, 
moral phenomenology is the study of the experiential dimension of our moral inner life 
– of the phenomenal character of moral mental states. 
(The term “moral phenomenology” is used sometimes to denote a subject and 
sometimes to denote a subject matter. Here, I will reserve it for the subject, and use 
“moral experience” to denote the subject matter. Under this terminological regime, 
moral phenomenology is the dedicated study of moral experience.) 
Many different questions arise within moral phenomenology, but perhaps they can be 
profitably filed under three headings. The first concerns the scope of moral experience: 
How much of our moral mental life is experiential? That is, which moral mental states 
have a phenomenal character? The second concerns the nature of moral experience: 
What is it like to undergo the various kinds of moral experience we have? What is the 
proper phenomenological analysis of each type of moral experience? The third 
concerns the theoretical effect of moral experience: How might our understanding of 
moral experience impact central debates in moral philosophy? That is, what are the 
consequences of phenomenological “results” on larger ethical and metaethical 
questions? We will now consider each of these types of question. 
*** 
In considering the scope of moral experience, the least controversial varieties will 
involve areas of mental life that both are uncontroversially moral and clearly have an 
experiential dimension. Moral emotions (see EMOTION) are a case in point: the feeling of 
indignation at a certain injustice is clearly a moral mental state and has a characteristic 
phenomenal character. The same holds for certain varieties of respect, compassion, 
gratitude, contempt, (out)rage, guilt, and other moral emotions. Likewise, there are 
certain agentive or conative mental states that clearly appear both moral and 
experiential – conscious moral desire (see DESIRE) and moral decision come to mind. 
More controversial forms of moral experience are moral perception (see PERCEPTION, 
MORAL) and moral judgment or belief. They are controversial for different reasons: it is 
clear that perception has a phenomenal character, but controversial that any 
perception is genuinely moral; by contrast, it is clear that some judgments/beliefs are 
genuinely moral, but less clear that judgments or beliefs have phenomenal character. 
Thus, admitting the existence of these kinds of moral experience involves certain 
substantive commitments. Sensibility theorists (McDowell 1979; see SENSIBILITY THEORY), 
for example, will argue that there is a kind of perception which is genuinely moral, and 
therefore that some moral experience is perceptual. Some proponents of cognitive 
phenomenology (Strawson 1994; Pitt 2004) – philosophers who argue that purely 
cognitive mental states do sometimes exhibit a proprietary type of phenomenal 
character – could argue that moral judgments/beliefs have a distinctive phenomenal 
character, and therefore qualify as a type of moral experience. 
An expansive moral phenomenology would admit not only moral emotion and 
agency, but also moral perception and cognition (judgments/beliefs), and perhaps 
even more (e.g., sui generis moral intuition), as forms of moral experience. A more 
timid moral phenomenology would accept only moral emotion and agency, or perhaps 
even less (e.g., denying moral agency is experiential), as genuine moral experience. 
How the question of the scope of moral experience is settled will depend partly on 
empirical results of appropriate inquiry, but also on conceptual and methodological 
issues concerning what it takes for something to qualify as “experiential” or 
“phenomenal,” and how we ought to cull and analyze phenomenological data. 
*** 
Let us move on, then, to the question of the nature of moral experience. Here, the 
phenomenological investigation can be pursued at two levels, global and local. Global 
moral phenomenology concerns the extrinsic relations that episodes of moral 
experience bear to each other and to nonexperiential mental states: (i) how much of 
our stream of consciousness is taken up by moral experience, (ii) which types of moral 
experience (emotional, cognitive, etc.) are more dominant in our moral life, (iii) whether 
there is a phenomenal feature which is common and peculiar to moral experiences, 
and which can thus serve as the “phenomenal signature” of moral experience, etc. 
Local moral phenomenology concerns the internal phenomenal character and structure 
of specific episodes of moral experience: (i) what the salient phenomenal characteristics 
of this or that moral experience are, (ii) whether the phenomenal character of 
prototypical episodes of moral experience is more cognitive or more conative in 
nature, (iii) whether any moral experiences phenomenally present themselves as having 
objective pretensions, etc. Although some “global” question have been the subject of 
heated debate – in particular, the question of whether moral mental states have any 
phenomenal character in common (see Gill 2008, Sinnott-Armstrong 2008) – it is on the 
“local” questions that moral phenomenologists have tended to focus. In particular, 
many moral philosophers in the phenomenological tradition have offered analyses of 
certain moral experiences that they took to be foundational in our conscious life as 
morally aware beings.  
Already Franz Brentano, the “grandfather” of the phenomenological movement, 
offered a detailed account of an experience he considered the Archimedean point of 
our moral understanding of reality (see BRENTANO, FRANZ). The account proceeds by a 
series of three “phenomenal contrasts,” whereby a subtle experiential feature is 
brought into introspective relief by contrasting conscious states that feature it with 
ones that do not (Brentano 1889, §27). Suppose we meet extraterrestrials who turn out 
to have two peculiarities. First, they frown on the use of toothpaste and commend 
instead the use of mud-and- earthworm paste for the brushing of teeth; second, they 
frown on the deliberate inducement of joy in others and commend rather the 
deliberate inducement of suffering. Three contrasts are highlighted by Brentano. First, 
when we contemplate “side by side” our preferences and theirs when it comes to 
means of tooth-brushing, we are clearly aware of a strong and incontrovertible 
attachment to our own preferences. Second, when we do the same with respect to our 
distribution of commendation and condemnation of deliberate inducement of joy and 
suffering in others, we again experience a strong and incontrovertible preference for 
our own distribution. Third, and crucially, when we contrast our preference for our own 
approach to tooth-brushing with our preference for our own approach to others’ joy 
and suffering, we notice an experiential feature present in the latter but not the former: 
the inducement of joy in others is experienced as inherently and self-evidently worthy 
of approval, and the deliberate inducement of suffering as inherently and self-evidently 
worthy of disapproval, whereas this experience of inherent and self-evident meriting is 
absent for tooth-brushing. For Brentano, it is through this experience of things 
inherently and self-evidently meriting our approval or disapproval that we obtain our 
original grasp on the realm of moral value.  
Brentano’s most prominent student, Edmund Husserl, engaged in important 
phenomenological analyses of intersubjectivity, but many of his students made even 
more central contributions to moral phenomenology (see HUSSERL, EDMUND). Edith 
Stein, for example, argued that our moral relationship to the world is based on a sui 
generis affective experience of other people as not just intentional objects populating 
our own phenomenal world, but as constituting independent centers of intentional 
directedness onto a numerically distinct phenomenal world (Stein 1917). Correctly 
characterizing the way in which the other’s inner life is present to our mind in this kind 
of experience, which Stein calls empathy, requires some care (see EMPATHY). On the 
one hand, when we see a person writhing in pain before us, her pain is present to our 
mind in a direct and unmediated way characteristic of perceptual encounter; it is not 
present in the form of a mere theoretical posit we reach through rational inference 
from perceived behavior. On the other hand, we clearly do not experience this 
person’s suffering the way we experience our own. Rather, Stein likens this to the 
perceptual experience of the backside of a material object. When we see a car driving 
by, we experience it as a complete, three-dimensional car, not as a two-dimensional 
car-surface facing us. The unseen part of the car is somehow built into our perceptual 
experience of the car. The suffering of another is given to us in the same way: it shows 
up in the direct perceptual experience of the other as a whole person, despite being 
“unseen” the way the car’s backside is unseen.  
A crucial figure in linking the phenomenological tradition with English-speaking moral 
philosophy is Maurice Mandelbaum, whose book The Phenomenology of Moral 
Experience (Mandelbaum 1955) played an important role in igniting interest in the 
phenomenal character of moral experience among analytic philosophers (see Horgan 
and Timmons 2008a, 2008b). According to Mandelbaum, the prototypical moral 
experience is that of a “direct moral judgment,” where one is confronted with a morally 
pregnant situation calling on one to react. Such experiences, claims Mandelbaum, 
involve a phenomenal character of felt demand. Mandelbaum describes this 
phenomenal character as a sort of force, which like every force has a source and a 
direction: the source is always experienced as external to us, and the direction always 
as pointed at us. 
Mandelbaum’s analysis casts the phenomenal character of moral experience as 
having a straightforward objectivist purport. According to Horgan and Timmons 
(2008b), however, moral experience is a little subtler than this. They suggest that moral 
experience has an objective purport only in a limited sense. It has objective purport 
inasmuch as it has a belief-ish phenomenal character, and moreover phenomenally 
presents itself as impartial, nonarbitrary, and reason-based. However, it does not 
necessarily present itself phenomenally as answerable to external, mind-independent 
facts, and to that extent it does not have a more robust objectivist or realist purport. By 
this Horgan and Timmons do not mean that moral experience presents itself to 
introspection as unanswerable to mind-independent moral facts; rather, they claim that 
introspection seems silent on the matter, and this means that there is no introspective 
evidence for objective purport in moral experience (Horgan and Timmons 2007).   
Both Mandelbaum and Horgan and Tienson highlight the belief-ish or judgment-like 
phenomenal character of moral experience. Brentano and Stein, in contrast, construe 
the crucial experience as rather affective or emotion-like. Thus the theme of whether 
moral life lies fundamentally in emotion or in reason, which theme recurs throughout 
moral philosophy, has its phenomenological manifestation as well. One possible view is 
that there are two kinds of moral experience, one essentially emotional and the other 
essentially cognitive. One can consciously intellectually judge that genocide is wrong, 
and one can feel emotionally indignant about genocide. Both conscious states morally 
evaluate genocide (Kriegel 2012). Arguably, however, they do so very differently: in the 
judgment that conscious genocide is wrong, the experienced wrongness is part of what 
one experiences, so the evaluation is implicated in the content of one’s conscious 
state; in the felt indignation about genocide, the experienced wrongness is an aspect 
of how one experiences, so that the evaluation is built into the very attitude 
characteristic of indignation. We might say that the judgment experientially represents 
genocide-as-wrong, whereas the indignation experientially represents-as-wrong 
genocide (see Kriegel 2015). This gives a certain fundamentality to emotional moral 
experiences, since their moral evaluation is essential to the very type of conscious state 
they are (whereas moral judgments are seen to be simply the subset of judgments that 
happen to have a moral proposition for their content). 
*** 
Hopefully this small selection of phenomenological claims and analyses in the extant 
literature manages to give a flavor of the kind of research one might designate as 
“moral phenomenology.” Let us turn, then, to the question of the theoretical impact 
and relevance of moral phenomenology. Here too, it would be useful to distinguish 
two levels of relevance: to first-order normative ethics and to metaethics. On the one 
hand, moral phenomenology can importantly inform debates within and among 
consequentialist (see CONSEQUENTIALISM), deontological (see DEONTOLOGY), and virtue-
ethical (see VIRTUE ETHICS) ethical frameworks. On the other hand, it can also inform 
debates between cognitivism and expressivism, realism (see REALISM, MORAL) and anti-
realism, etc. 
To start, consider that there is a potential central role for moral phenomenology in 
each of the major (first-order) ethical theories. Thus, in the most straightforward version 
of consequentialism, the right action is identified with the action which would be 
instrumental in bringing about the maximum non-instrumental/intrinsic goodness 
(and/or the minimum non-instrumental/intrinsic badness) in the world. And while many 
things feature in lists of non-instrumental goods and evils, pleasure and pain show up 
on the list almost universally. The idea is that whatever instrumental value pleasure 
might have, other things being equal it is also good for its own sake (see PLEASURE). 
Observe, now, that what makes pleasure have “positive” value and pain “negative” 
value is presumably their phenomenal character – it is unclear what (non-instrumental) 
reason there might be to avoid inducing non-experienced pain (if such there be). We 
can therefore expect that phenomenological analysis of pleasure, pain, and other 
affectively valenced conscious states (e.g., feeling content, feeling embarrassed) would 
bear on the question of which mental states are non-instrumentally or intrinsically 
valuable.  
Consider next the first version of deontological ethical theory to come to mind, the 
categorical-imperative-centered Kantian ethics (see CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE; KANT, 
IMMANUEL). In its most intuitive formulation – the “humanity formula” – the categorical 
imperative calls on us to treat humanity, whether ours or others’, always also as an end 
in itself and never merely as a means. What this comes to depends on what is involved 
in treating someone as an end. Note that the formula does not prohibit treating others 
as means, only treating them as mere means, and that this implies that it is possible to 
treat someone simultaneously as an end and as a means. This in turns entails that it is 
impossible to analyze treating someone as an end purely negatively, in terms of 
avoiding treating them as a means. Some positive characterization of treating as an 
end is called for. This positive characterization will likely address both the functional 
role and the phenomenal character of the mental states of a moral agent who treats 
someone as an end. More specifically, it is unlikely that the state that grounds treating 
someone as an end – perhaps a kind of respect – could be fully characterized without 
any phenomenological remarks on the agent’s experience while treating a patient as 
an end (see RESPECT). In other words, the phenomenology of Kantian respect for 
persons is likely crucial for understanding Kant’s humanity formula (see Kriegel and 
Timmons forthcoming).  
Finally, consider the classical form of virtue ethics, as developed in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics (see ARISTOTLE). Here the central maxim can be captured in the 
principle that we ought to do the right thing “to the right person, at the right amount, 
at the right time, for the right end, and in the right way” (1109a27-9). Compare giving 
a generous handout to a homeless person with contempt versus with compassion in 
one’s heart. And compare further the generously acting person who believes that 
homeless people are her equal but cannot stop feeling a sense of superiority toward 
them versus the person who feels that homeless people are her equal. The virtuous 
agent does not only do the right thing, and does not only believe the right thing, but 
also feels the right way. This raises the question of what the virtuous agent feels – what 
is the distinctive phenomenal character of what she experiences as she acts. Annas 
(2008) argues that the phenomenology of virtue is the phenomenology of flow, where 
the agent experiences no inner resistance to, and no need for effort in, performing the 
right action. Other views of the matter are certainly possible, but it is clear that a 
phenomenological investigation into the character and structure of the experience of 
virtuous agency ought to be part of the program of virtue ethics. 
As for the relevance of moral phenomenology to metaethics, there is a long tradition 
of invoking phenomenological considerations in the context of the debate over moral 
realism. One traditional argument for realism is that moral experience presents itself as 
answering to a realm of mind-independent moral facts, and so we would be under 
massive illusion if there were no such realm. Although some philosophers are willing to 
bite the bullet and adopt a so-called error theory (Mackie 1977; see ERROR THEORY), 
most consider that this is a price very much worth avoiding. To avoid paying it, one 
could argue either (i) that the inference from the character of moral experience to the 
reality of such moral facts is problematic, or (ii) that moral experience does not in fact 
present itself as answering to moral facts in the way realists have claimed (Loeb 2007). 
This latter strategy requires engaging in some moral phenomenology. The result of this 
engagement thus directly affects the cases for moral realism and irrealism. 
Consider next the debate over cognitivism. Perhaps the most central argument for 
cognitivism relies on the Frege–Geach observation (see FREGE–GEACH OBJECTION) that 
moral judgments have an inferential role characteristic of the cognitive (Geach 1960). 
Arguably, however, the intuitive pull of cognitivism owes much to the introspective 
impression that moral mental states feel cognitive, or belief-like (Horgan and Timmons 
2007). This is arguably why technical accommodations of the Frege–Geach problem by 
non-cognitivists (e.g., Gibbard 2003) do not undo the appeal of cognitivism. Thus, it 
would seem that the battle over the respective merits of cognitivism and non-
cognitivism must be fought on at least two fronts: the Frege–Geach problem and the 
phenomenology of moral experience. 
*** 
In conclusion, the area of moral phenomenology is of unmistakable relevance to the 
most central issues of moral philosophy, and is relatively wide open in terms of the 
number of issues within it that remain underexplored, concerning the scope and nature 
of various types of moral experience. Its pursuit has been limited and disparate until 
very recently, perhaps due to the sense of intractability that attached to 
phenomenology in general. Yet, in relevant areas of philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science, this initial sense of intractability has ceased to be paralyzing some time ago. It 
can therefore be expected with some justification that a parallel development will 
enhance research in moral phenomenology over the coming years and decades. 
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